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Violent religious extremism is seen as one of the mega-problems of the 21st century. This 
article – based on a key lecture at the conference on ‘Violence in a democratic South Africa’ 
at the University of Pretoria and the David de Villiers memorial lecture at the University 
of Stellenbosch, both held during August 2010 – critically discussed the interaction between 
religion and violence in our present-day, globalised world. Three different propositions on 
the relationship between religion and violence were scrutinised. In countering the proposition 
that religion, or more specifically monotheism, necessarily leads to violence, it was argued 
that violence is not an inherent, but rather an acquired or even an ascribed quality of religion. 
The second proposition that religion leads to non-violence was affirmed to the extent that 
religions do provide a strong impulse to overcome violence. However, they also tend to 
accept violence as an inevitable part of reality and even justify the use of violence on religious 
grounds. The third proposition was regarded as the most convincing, for it argues that the 
link between religion and violence is contingent. Some situations do seem to make the use of 
violence inevitable; however, religions should refrain from justifying the use of violence and 
maintain a preferential option for nonviolence. 
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Many people around the world celebrated the release of Nelson Mandela from prison on 11 
February 1990, an event that marked the beginning of a new, democratic South Africa. This 
new South Africa, however, is now faced with a number of serious problems that need to be 
addressed, amongst which is the problem of violence. To begin examining this problem with 
the aim of finding a resolution to it, we need to ask ourselves: what does ‘democracy’ mean? 
The answer is that it quite simply refers to the organisation of the political process according to 
democratic principles. The South African people can testify proudly that they govern themselves 
according to one of the most remarkable democratic constitutions of the world. Democracy is, at 
the same time, a spirit by which a society is characterised. It is a spirit of freedom and justice, of 
solidarity and nonviolence. Yet, that spirit is endangered in South Africa, as well as in other parts 
of the world. 
Nothing is more dangerous for such a democratic spirit than an atmosphere of hatred and 
violence. Our time is characterised by an open conflict between two tendencies. On the one hand, 
freedom, human rights, peace and justice became elements of the political order at a national, 
as well as international level. On the other hand, we observe not only a resurgence of the spirit 
of hatred and violence, but, even worse, its justification and promotion by means of seemingly 
religious reasons. That leads to a situation in which violent religious extremism is seen as one 
of the mega-problems of the 21st century (see e.g. Martin 2007). Together with global warming, 
exponential population growth, water shortages, and pandemics, specifically HIV and AIDS, 
this violent extremism forms one of the biggest challenges that societies are facing on a global 
scale. Therefore, in this paper I will address the interaction between religion and violence in our 
present-day, globalised world.
Firstly, I will turn briefly to the definition of violence and then describe some forms in which 
we observe a new linkage between religion and violence. Secondly, I will discuss three different 
propositions on the relationship between religion and violence: a necessary connection between 
religion and violence, religious criticism of violence and, finally, a contingent relationship 
between religion and violence. Thirdly, this will lead us to some insights into the tasks religious 
bodies should address in the future. However, a detailed description of these tasks would require 
an additional paper, so I will confine my argument herein to the linkage between religion and 
violence and its current interpretations. 
What is violence?
There is a longstanding debate on the meaning of the term ‘violence’. The restriction of the term 
only to the physical violation of persons creates problems. On the one hand, such a restriction 
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might give the mistaken impression that the destruction of 
things is pardonable compared to the use of violence against 
human persons. On the other hand, it is obvious that human 
persons can be affected just as negatively by structural 
restrictions as by physical violence; therefore, it is for a good 
reason that the concept of structural violence was introduced. 
Structural violence in this sense is found in all structural 
conditions that prevent people from developing and using 
their capabilities. The segregation of ethnic groups in the 
United States of America before the success of the civil rights 
movement and the system of apartheid in South Africa, have 
often been used as examples for such structural violence. 
But even in the case of direct violence, not every violation 
of human persons takes the form of physical violence. We 
know of psychological and other forms of non-physical, but 
highly effective, violence by which people are hurt. Today, 
bullying at the working place is often described as a form 
of such psychological violence. ‘Violent language’ – namely 
language that hurts people – is another example that should 
not be underestimated.
What is most important in such a broader reflection on the 
understanding of violence is a shift in perspective. Recent 
research looks at violence not primarily from the perspective 
of the act and its perpetrator, but from the perspective 
of the victim. Empathy for the victim becomes the key to 
understanding violence. Therefore our image of violence 
is formed not so much by the means but by the effects of 
violence and not so much by the intentions of the actors but 
through the consequences for the victims. 
However, there is also a need to define the limits of the 
term ‘violence’. Anyone who has tried to wrestle with the 
problems of terminology, as indicated above, has had to 
address the concern that the term ‘violence’, itself, is simply 
too vague. Violence in this broad sense seems to be an 
omnipresent reality; the hope to limit, to contain and, at least 
partly, to overcome violence, seems futile when the term is 
used in such a limitless sense. For the purpose of this paper, 
therefore, I restrict myself to the problem of direct, physical 
violence exerted by human persons against one another.
 
Yet, even in this narrow sense, however, violence is 
extremely manifold. In naming these different forms we 
have to keep in mind that whilst many forms of criminal 
violence are recorded, a high percentage of violence remains 
hidden. Without pretending completeness we can name 
the following possible entries in a list of different forms of 
physical violence committed by human beings against other 
human beings: personal violence – especially violence against 
children and acts of rape, violence in families and on the 
streets, other forms of criminal violence affecting individual 
lives, as well as the social fabric, terrorist violence ranging 
from suicide bombing to organised warfare, civil wars in 
failed states or between states, foreign military interventions 
on humanitarian, economic, or other grounds, and – finally 
– a monopoly of the state on the legitimate use of physical 
force. 
Violence in South Africa
South Africa is a paradigmatic case of the way in which the 
manifold faces of violence are intermingled. The ‘oppressive 
violence’ of the apartheid system is, in its consequences, still 
present. The ‘reactive violence’ in the upheavals of resistance 
is still commemorated. The ‘repressive reaction’ of the state 
security system violated the lives of many people, as some 
of the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
made clear in a horrifying manner. And, finally, ‘destructive 
violence’ is still spreading across South Africa from year 
to year (for the distinction between oppressive, reactive, 
repressive and destructive violence see Smit 2007:49f). In 
many cases, this destructive violence is combined with 
xenophobic attacks, but also often occurs without any 
political connotation. It destroys individual lives as well 
as social coherence. It is therefore also called ‘social fabric 
crime’ (cf. Mistry, Snyman & Van Zyl 2001). 
Ethical traditions are, in principle, clear in their judgement 
on physical violence. ‘Thou shalt not kill’ is a basic 
commandment in religious and humanistic ethical traditions. 
However, there are many controversial issues related to this 
basic commandment. The use of coercion in education and 
family relations, especially against children and women, 
was widely accepted and is still accepted in different 
cultures throughout the world. This is an example of the 
slow changes of behavioural patterns in this respect. There 
also is a disturbing continuity in the use of violence against 
minorities in many societies. 
Serious research shows that religiosity does not necessarily 
lead to a decrease but rather, at least in certain circumstances, 
to an increase in latent or manifest violence. This tendency is 
astonishing, considering that at least the three monotheistic 
religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam include the 
commandment to love one’s neighbour as one of their 
central ethical commandments (for an Islamic perspective, 
see Muslim religious leaders 2007; see also Eissler 2009). 
What could be the driving force negating the basic religious 
stricture not to kill but rather to respect the dignity of the 
other and to love one’s neighbour? What could be the reason 
for the violation of the ‘Golden Rule’: to treat the others 
as we ourselves would like to be treated? Some argue that 
aggression is so inherent in human nature that it cannot be 
limited by ethical or even religious restraints. But that is 
obviously not true. People are able to limit their aggression, 
they listen to the voice of their conscience and invent the 
instruments of law to overcome or limit the tendency to hurt 
one another. 
The better question in this regard then is: why, are the sources 
of religion not used in this direction but, on the contrary, 
become instrumental in the intensification of hatred and the 
readiness to use violence? To explain this linkage between 
religiosity and the use of violence, it is often argued that 
when people are convinced of the superiority of their own 
belief system they tend to devalue those of a different faith 
(see Küpper & Zick 2010). But, again, this is not an inevitable 
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consequence. Personal trust in the truth of a specific religion 
does not imply the need to disrespect people of other faiths. 
Historically, we can find examples of both the peaceful 
coexistence of religions and of violent conflicts between them. 
Other explanations do not relate to religious factors in the 
narrow sense of the word, but to cultural factors. Some 
observe, for instance, that conservative Turkish families 
with a Muslim background cultivate an ideal of masculinity 
that legitimises the use of violence by young men (for 
the debate over the new findings of the Kriminologisches 
Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen and its director Christian 
Pfeiffer, see e.g. Kelek 2010). Evidently, it would be a 
simplistic interpretation to assert that Islam as a religion 
implies the justification of violence exerted by young males. 
However, there is no strict separation between religious 
commands and cultural traditions. Religious education 
always relates to social and cultural factors and it is therefore 
not easy to separate them from each other. However, such 
complex interactions should not be interpreted in a reductive 
and therefore simplistic manner. 
To summarise, none of these explanations leads to a necessary 
linkage between religion and violence. But they provoke the 
question why the impulses of religions are not translated 
more consistently into the behaviour of their adherents. 
Religion seems to be limited in its influence in anomic 
situations, in situations of extreme inequality, or in situations 
in which children are raised in an atmosphere of mistrust 
and violence and so internalise this atmosphere from the 
beginning of their lives. In such situations, it is not enough to 
proclaim the good values of religions or ethical systems. One 
has to work on the conditions in which children are raised 
and have to live. Thus – to name the most important aspects 
of the tasks to be addressed – one has to change the anomic 
situation, one has to work for justice in society and one has to 
improve the educational conditions for children and youth. 
These days, South Africa provides an outstanding example 
of such an approach to the problem of violence resulting 
from anomic situations in society. We also have to keep in 
mind the specific factor that the amount of violence that 
affects the social fabric in this country continuously reflects 
the ongoing consequences of the inherently and evidently 
violent apartheid regime. We therefore cannot understand 
the disturbing role of violence in South Africa at present, 
without relating it to the centrality of violence in its history. 
Violence on a global scale
As already indicated, the general ethical debate on violence 
deals mainly with the problem of collective physical violence. 
Until 1989, the European debate was concentrated on the 
potential for violence inherent in the antagonism between 
the two superpowers – the USA and the Soviet Union – and 
their respective satellite states. This antagonism came to an 
end without the much anticipated transition from ‘cold war’ 
to ‘hot war’. This historical miracle bolstered the hope for a 
‘peace dividend’ after the peaceful European revolution of 
1989, for a containment of military violence that would, in 
the end, further the use of available funds for sustainable 
development and for the promotion of global justice. Yet, 
none of those expectations was fulfilled. The Millennium 
Development Goals proclaimed by the United Nations in 
the year 2000, with the intention of reducing global poverty 
by half by the year 2015, did not trigger a thrust towards 
sustainable development. The great confrontation between 
East and West has been followed by a plurality of military 
confrontations, many protagonists of which have been non-
state actors, such as the war-lords in Afghanistan and those 
parties engaged in civil wars. Indeed, the world public still 
has to learn that the use of violence by non-state actors can 
result in wars.
Terrorist violence has become a rather omnipresent 
phenomenon in the world today. For the international 
conscience, 11 September 2001 continues to function as 
a historical watershed in that it has given international 
terrorism a new shape. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were 
directed at the economic, military and political power 
centres of the USA, but affected the whole world. They had 
an explicitly religious motivation, as explained in the manual 
of ‘spiritual guidelines’ that was found in the hands of the 
attackers (cf. Kippenberg & Seidensticker [eds.] 2006). Other 
attacks in Europe followed – in Madrid in 2004, in London 
in 2005 and some failed terrorist attempts in the following 
years. To a much greater extent, people in the Muslim world, 
itself, have fallen victim to religiously motivated terror 
attacks, as the cases of violence in Afghanistan, Nigeria and 
Sudan testify. Indeed, since 2001, the interaction between 
religion and violence belongs to the characteristic traits of 
our era of globalisation, which dictate that people’s destinies 
become dependent on the uncertainties of the market and 
that traditional forms of solidarity are dissolved. These 
phenomena create new tasks for religions. Their ethic of 
‘brotherhood’ has stepped in to take the place of traditional 
solidarities. But, often, this ethic of ‘brotherhood’ is combined 
with a fundamentalist worldview that can result in a violent 
confrontation with those who do not belong to the same 
group, are not adherents of the same religion and do not 
envisage the same political goals. A new idea of martyrdom 
has developed that promises immediate access to paradise 
for those who sacrifice their lives in a ‘holy war’. 
This is one of the ways in which violence is understood as 
being akin to worship in our times (cf. Kippenberg 2008:161–
184). Such examples can be useful in countering the notion 
that the linkage between religion and violence is limited 
to one religious community. However, this does not take 
away from the fact that 9/11, as well as the suicide attacks 
that are part of the conflict in the Middle East, directs our 
attention towards the renewal of the Islamic jihad doctrine 
in particular. Today, this doctrine is often given a meaning 
in which the ‘holy wars’ of the individual against his or her 
inner person, those against the evil around him or her and, 
finally, those against unbelievers, are intertwined. In such 
a framework, the transition from tolerance of unbelievers 
to violence against them plays a decisive role. Of crucial 
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relevance in this respect is the so-called ‘Verse of the Sword’ 
in the Qur’an:
Once the Sacred Months are past, (and they refuse to make peace) 
you may kill the idol worshipers when you encounter them, 
punish them, and resist every move they make. If they repent 
and observe the Contact Prayers (Salat) and give the obligatory 
charity (Zakat), you shall let them go. GOD is Forgiver, Most 
Merciful. 
(Sura 9:5) 
As Islamic studies have shown, this verse documents the 
changed attitude of the prophet Mohammed towards 
unbelievers after his transition from Mecca to Medina 
(Kippenberg 2008:177–178). It is thought likely that this verse 
replaced an older revelation of differing content. Whereas 
violence against the unbelievers is seen here as obligatory, 
in his Mecca period Mohammed coexisted rather peacefully 
with the unbelievers. This inner tension in the Qur’an has 
repeatedly provoked controversial interpretations. But 
there is no doubt that the tendencies towards a new kind of 
religious violence that have been observed in Islam since the 
1970s are based on the aspect of Jihad directed towards the 
unbelievers. 
But, again, the new linkage between religion and violence 
is not restricted to Islam alone. This linkage exists also in 
Christianity. The Iraq War of 2003 was an example of the use of 
religious arguments to propagate war. In this highly debated 
case, some understood the war against Iraq as the execution 
of a death penalty against Saddam Hussein – accepting the 
danger that many other Iraqis were far more likely to lose 
their lives than the well-protected dictator himself. Insofar 
as one could argue that one form of violence is not equal to 
other forms of violence, the religious justification for terrorist 
violence has to be judged differently from the religious 
interpretation of the use of violence in the framework of a 
state monopoly on violence. But even respect for the state’s 
task of securing peace and justice by all necessary means 
– under certain conditions even violent means – turns into 
a highly problematic proposition if it becomes a bellicose 
concept that gives preference to military violence over other 
means – political, economic, or legal – in whichever context, 
religious or nonreligious, such a preference may occur. The 
application of a religious justification for the death penalty to 
international relations leads, with inner necessity, to a kind 
of bellicosity which, in dubious cases, privileges war over 
other possible solutions. 
 
The linkage between religion and violence occurs today in 
different religions. This nurtures a kind of public debate that 
does not differentiate adequately. These developments – as 
complex as they may be – result in a rather simplistic public 
perception: the justification of violence is seen as a crucial 
element of religion in general. From such a perspective, 
the political role of religion is understood as preparing for 
and justifying the use of violence. In our times, the critique 
of religion has its centre very often in the critique of the 
interaction of religion and violence. The point of criticism 
here is simply that religion leads to violence. This critique 
responds to a situation in which violence seems to become 
present everywhere. The ubiquity of violence is part of the 
globalisation process; violence, itself, is globalised. This is 
true in the sense that violence is omnipresent in the media. 
Everyone has easy access to all kinds of violence through 
TV or the Internet. Everyone has access to reports about 
how successful new academic elites are as actors in the field 
of violence. Even the importance of the arms trade within 
the global economy has led to violence being deemed an 
important economic good in and of itself. 
When one starts to analyse this position critically one can 
see different patterns of interpretation. Firstly, some posit 
a necessary connection between religion and violence, 
secondly, others point to a religious criticism of violence and, 
thirdly, still others note a contingent relationship between 
religion and violence. We will now turn to a discussion of 
these patterns of interpretation. 
Three propositions on the 
relationship between religion and 
violence 
Religion leads to violence
On an academic and intellectual level, this widespread 
assumption is currently discussed in a version proposed by 
the well-known German Egyptologist, Jan Assmann (1997, 
2003), in his recent statements on monotheism. Briefly, 
Assmann says that the biblical connection between Moses 
and Egypt leads us back to the reform of Pharaoh Echnaton 
in the 14th century BC, who tried to replace the old Egyptian 
deities with Re or Aton, the God of the Sun. This reform was 
not successful, but became part of cultural memory in Egypt, 
including the enslaved people of Israel who lived there. It 
was Moses who adopted this idea and created an exclusive 
monotheism for the people of Israel that denied the right of 
existence to all other Gods. Assmann distinguishes this kind 
of monotheism from other forms of henotheism, in which 
the cosmic order gives a place to all deities but veneration 
is concentrated on one God. Distinguishing this religious 
attitude from monotheism, Assmann calls it ‘cosmotheism’. 
For him, the so-called monotheistic religions – Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam – are exclusive by nature and therefore 
have a tendency to be violent, whereas cosmotheism is 
peaceful by nature. The violent character of the monotheism 
he refers to is not a question of historical data on the ways in 
which monotheism gained superiority as such, but rather a 
‘semantic paradigm’ that explains how such processes were 
remembered. For instance, it is historically probable that, 
in Judaism, violence was used against internal dissenters 
rather than against adherents of other religions. Already, the 
Hebrew Bible includes more examples of the suffering of the 
people of Israel under the polytheism of its neighbouring 
powers than of the perpetration of violence in the name of the 
one God of Israel. That was even more, and terribly, the case 
in later historical times. But there has also been no consistent 
line of justification for violence in Christianity or Islam. So the 
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semantic paradigm of monotheism does not mean that the 
use of violence is justified or practiced in every single case. 
It is not sufficient to go back to the ‘Mosaic distinction’ in 
order to explain the problem of religiously justified violence. 
It is rather superficial to proclaim, as the philosopher Peter 
Sloterdijk (2007:211) has, a ‘renaissance in the sign of Egypt’ 
in order to ‘destroy the poison that declares all other cults to 
be enemies’. Finally, it seems misleading when the German 
sociologist Ulrich Beck (2008:220) argues that all truth claims 
in religions have to be invalidated (by whom?) as a condition 
for respecting the ‘religious otherness of the other’.
It is not the religious truth claim as such, but rather its 
exclusivist misconception that makes it a motive for violence 
and warfare. This exclusivity occurs today in fundamentalist 
movements of religious renewal. These movements are 
reacting to the processes of globalisation, for they respond 
to the dissolution of traditional forms of solidarity and to the 
experience of cultural fluidity by reverting to simple religious 
‘truths’. It is not monotheism, as such, but the protest against 
modernisation, in which they partake simultaneously, that 
makes fundamentalism a threat to peaceful coexistence. 
There are also other points that shed critical light on the more 
recent debate on monotheism (cf. Angenendt 2008; Schieder 
2008). The horrible outbreaks of violence during the 20th 
century, for instance, cannot be attributed to a connection 
between monotheism and violence. This is most evident 
in the case of the murderous violence perpetrated by Nazi 
Germany after 1933. On the contrary, Nazi ideology clearly 
used elements taken from ancient German polytheism. 
Moreover, the ideology of blood and soil, or of a specific 
German ‘Volksnomos’, was evidently and directly opposed to 
the recognition of the one God. 
To go a step further, we have to recognise that the idea of 
one, single monotheism that has unfolded differently in 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam is intrinsically problematic. 
In Judaism, adherence to the one God developed in stages 
over a long period of time; it is an unhistorical construction 
to call Moses a monotheist in the generally accepted sense of 
the word today. In Christianity, monotheism unfolds as the 
faith in one God, represented in three persons. In Islam, this 
Christian understanding is explicitly seen as ‘polytheism’ and 
therefore as an apostasy from true monotheism. It is exactly 
this Christian position that is sharply criticised in the already 
quoted ‘Verse of the Sword’. This fits with observations 
that the concept of ‘monotheism’ and its undifferentiated 
application to all three religions is rather new. The history 
of the word ‘monotheism’ begins only in the 17th century 
and was used as a general concept comprising the three 
religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam only in the 19th 
century (Hülsewiesche 1984:142–146). It was in that period, 
with the confessional wars of early modernity in mind, that 
the general statement was formulated that monotheism 
necessarily implies an intolerant and violent attitude towards 
the adherents of other religions or confessions. Since then, the 
critical perspective has been formulated that monotheism, as 
the idea of the superiority of one’s own religion, and violence 
depend on one another.
Today, this thesis is often combined with the assumption of 
a clash of – religious – civilisations, as predicted by Samuel 
Huntington (1993, 1996). So far, this assumption does not 
have sufficient empirical evidence. In fact, today’s military 
conflicts rarely have their original cause in differences of 
religion or confession. Many military conflicts are civil wars 
in which adherents of the same religion fight on both sides: 
Rwanda, Iraq and Iran are examples of this. In other conflicts 
– for instance, Kosovo or Sudan – the fighting ethnic groups 
are divided by religion, too. The role of religion can only be 
understood within a broader spectrum of the causes behind 
these conflicts. To the extent to which religion has been 
taken more seriously over the last 10 years, it is often seen 
as a driving force behind those conflicts, even if – and this 
is normally the case – the political and economic strengths 
or weaknesses of the respective countries or parties play an 
important role. 
Without any doubt, however, during the last decade we 
have been observing a tendency to regard religion as the 
one decisive factor sparking and feeding conflicts. This 
interpretation has to do with how the identity of ethnic, 
national, or social groups is predominantly seen through 
the lens of religion much more than before. The identity of 
groups and individuals always has many facets. It is therefore 
misleading to reduce this identity to one single factor. 
This reductive interpretation that conflates identity with 
religion intensifies conflicts, because it pits groups against 
one another, using only one denominator for their identity. 
When one looks at all Iraqis or all North-Sudanese only 
from the perspective that they are Muslims, then this trait 
of their identity will necessarily be seen as the driving force 
behind actual conflicts. As Amartya Sen (2006) has shown 
in an admirable manner, this use of religion as identity-
marker damages our understanding of identity, as well as 
our understanding of religion, and ends up advancing the 
deathly spiral of antagonism and violence. 
To justify and to drive violence in conflict is not an inherent 
and unchangeable characteristic of religion, but rather 
an acquired or even ascribed quality of religion. There 
are situations or contexts in which this kind of acquisition 
or ascription tends to be enforced, as seems to be the case 
today. The necessary answer to this dangerous constellation 
includes good historical research on the manifold reasons 
for conflicts and the forces behind them, as well as a self-
critical reflection within religious communities on their role 
in conflict and their possible functions in peace-building 
processes. 
Religion leads to nonviolence 
All religions include an impulse to overcome violence. 
The critique of violence in Old Testament prophecy, Jesus’ 
blessing of the peacemakers and the meek, and the Qur’an’s 
opposition to force in the name of religion – ‘there is no 
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compulsion in religion’ (Sura 2:226) – show, in different ways, 
the distance of those three religions to violence. The same can 
be demonstrated in the cases of Buddhism or Hinduism. 
There is a common advocacy by religions of the sanctity of 
life, the integrity of every human being and the nonviolent 
character of religious truth. The ‘Golden Rule’ that appears 
in one form or another in many different traditions of our 
world – that is, to treat the other in the same manner in which 
you want to be treated – demands a mutual recognition 
that would be violated by any kind of violence. The first 
expectation of every religion would be that it advocates a 
principle of nonviolence, rather than one of violence. This 
tendency is most explicit in Christianity but there is no reason 
to link it exclusively to the Christian faith. 
However, no religion, including Christianity, can claim 
consistency in its advocacy for nonviolence. All religions, in 
one way or another, take part in the ambiguity of dealing with 
a reality that includes violence on an individual, as well as 
on a social and international level. In our era, this ambiguity 
is very clearly encountered on a global level. Wars tend to 
become ‘world wars’ and the commitment to nonviolence 
becomes a global, ecumenical and even inter-religious 
commitment. The 20th century was a century in which 
examples of extreme violence and exemplary nonviolence 
occurred simultaneously. Both tendencies appeared across 
continents, cultures and religions. Nonviolence as a political 
strategy was introduced by a Hindu lawyer, Mahatma 
Ghandi, who was also well versed in the Christian religion 
and spent an important part of his lifetime in South Africa. 
Some Christians, such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin 
Luther King, Jr., who devoted their lives to the task of 
overcoming violence, became, as martyrs, shining examples 
for the adherents of different religions. In the USA, the 
nonviolent struggle for civil rights, the opposition to the 
Vietnam War, and the Sanctuary Movement showed the 
potential strength of religiously motivated nonviolence. 
Likewise, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa 
became an outstanding example of the possibilities of 
nonviolent transformation. Nelson Mandela very often 
underlined the great influence of Mahatma Gandhi on the 
South African struggle to overcome apartheid. The paradigm 
shift in the ethical debate from ‘just war’ to ‘just peace’ 
was prepared and promoted by those who, for their part, 
renounced all types of violence. 
Many of those who renounced all types of violence – 
across religions – used the example of Jesus and referred 
repeatedly to the Sermon on the Mount. The message of 
Jesus is characterised by a renunciation of violence, love 
for one’s enemy and blessings for those who champion 
peace without the use of violence. Jesus himself suffered 
from violence. Regarding his death on the cross, it is said, 
that it happened ‘once forever’ (Hb 10:10). A repetition of 
this sacrifice is therefore excluded; there is no compulsion 
to sacrifice. Therefore, it can be said that Christianity 
turned away from violence in a specifically radical manner. 
However, it could not resist the seduction of violence and 
its apparent unavoidability. The conviction that you cannot 
avoid answering violence with violence became a crucial 
point in Christian doctrine since the Constantine era. Since 
those times, violence has even occurred in the service of 
the church itself. Being a part of the world, the church did 
not only take the reality of violence into account. It went a 
step further and used violence for its own purposes. Every 
critical observer will be astonished time and again by the 
fact that a religion of love adapted so well to a climate of 
violence and even developed a theory about its inevitability. 
The idea of certain punishment for human sinfulness was not 
used in order to understand the human dependence on God 
as saviour. Instead, it was used in order to integrate human 
persons into a system of threat and punishment. The idea 
of nonviolence was often restricted to the private sphere, in 
which individuals could abstain from the coercion without 
which life in society, as a whole, was seen as impossible. On 
the one hand, this ambiguity was a sign of a religion that 
took ambivalent realities seriously; on the other hand, this 
happened at the expense of the clarity of Christian witness. 
Therefore, reform groups, peace churches and pacifists 
promoted self-critical reflection within Christianity and in 
dialogue with other religions. Their intention was to renew the 
clarity of the Christian witness as a witness for justice, peace 
and nonviolence, as well as for the poor. In our globalised 
world, we can also see this development taking on the form 
of a globalised movement. All religions that really address 
this issue are ‘risky religions’. They have to liberate their 
basic motives continually from the internal contradictions in 
which they become entangled. Mercy and power, love and 
violence, charity and profit, sustainability and self-interest – 
these are some of the basic tensions in which religions become 
involved in our globalised world. The effort to stand clearly 
for the preferential option of nonviolence, without blindness 
to the existing threats of violence, is a test of the identity of 
religions in our time. 
Religion and violence are linked to each other in 
a contingent manner
The linkage between religion and violence is not at all 
automatic. There is no inevitable and necessary relationship 
between monotheism and the justification of violence. 
Instead, such justification responds to particular historical 
circumstances and challenges. The linkage between 
monotheism and violence, wherever it occurs, is contingent; 
it is neither necessary nor impossible (Kippenberg 2008:22). 
Therefore, whether or not the critique of violence in religious 
traditions prevails in the behaviour of the faithful is also 
related to contingent factors.
Religion, in general, and monotheism, in particular, neither 
guarantee pacifist attitudes nor make them impossible. 
When pacifism not only relates to an individual conviction 
but also includes the responsibility to protect the freedom 
of others from coercion and violence, the crucial question is 
always whether a nonviolent practice is apt to overcome the 
use of violence from the other side, or rather give it free reign. 
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Whenever theories of ‘just war’ or ‘just peace’ regard the use 
of violence in particular concrete situations as an ultimate 
resort to end the violence that is already being exerted, the 
question has to be asked whether the violence that is designed 
to maintain or to restore the rule of law effectively limits the 
use of violence, or increases it. This fundamental ambiguity 
in the phenomenon of violence itself explains why religions 
have an ambivalent attitude toward it. However, at least for 
Christianity, it has to be said that this faith is consistent with 
its original impulse only if, even in ambivalent situations, 
it defends the priority for nonviolence over and against 
violence and therefore rejects a religious justification of 
violence, even in those cases in which the situation makes 
the use of violence seemingly inevitable. When measured 
by this criterion of clearly rejecting a religious justification 
for the use of violence, it becomes evident that the Christian 
churches have often failed. 
There is no critique of violence, no matter how radically 
formulated, that could save anybody from being sucked in 
by the seemingly never-ending cycle of violence and counter-
violence. The reason for this conundrum is that religions 
have to deal with reality as a whole. That this reality bears 
violent traits cannot be denied (Häring 2006). Reality, as a 
whole, includes not only personal lives from beginning to 
end, individual destinies with their joy and suffering, human 
freedom with its successes and failures – whether caused 
by fate or guilt – but also human communities, who have 
to deal with tensions between hate and love, conflict and 
reconciliation, as well as violence and peace. 
René Girard (1983, 1987), a French philosopher of culture, 
went one step further. In his view, dealing with violence – 
taming and overcoming it – represents the most important 
social function of religion. Religion channels violence and 
averts it. This is the reason behind rites of sacrifice in old 
religions. Therefore, it becomes self-contradictory when 
religions limit the use of violence in a ritualistic form but, in 
the same moment, justify it politically. Today, too, religions 
may be aware of the potential for violence in human life, but 
name and address them without justifying them. They may 
take into account the human tendency towards violence, 
but simultaneously oppose its glorification. They may avoid 
illusions about the susceptibility of human beings to violence, 
but not abandon the field to it. 
Conclusion
Let me summarise some results of these reflections in five 
proposals for further discussion.
Firstly, the linkage between religion and violence is one 
of the great challenges for the 21st century. It reveals the 
difficult aspects of globalisation in concentrated form: the 
erosion of culture, the increase in religious fundamentalism, 
the increasing domination of politics by economics, and the 
ubiquity of violence. 
Secondly, building on this, it has become clear that the process 
of globalisation has set new tasks for religious communities. 
New forms of public religion help people to find their place 
in a world full of uncertainties. Much depends on whether 
religious communities understand themselves as part of civil 
society, or as enemies of an existing society which endorses 
a violent struggle against it. This endorsement of violence by 
religious communities is often combined with new forms of 
religious fundamentalism, which poses a challenge for inter-
religious dialogue and sets a central task in defending the 
rule of law. 
Thirdly, it is of primary importance to maintain the distinction 
between religion and politics as a necessary precondition for 
peaceful coexistence in a religiously and culturally diverse 
world. This does not mean that religion and politics should 
not interact, but, in doing so, that they have to deal with 
different aspects of human life. It is the secular character of 
the political order that makes religious freedom possible. 
Fourthly, religions themselves can cooperate in order to 
promote peaceful coexistence and proscribe the use of 
violence as much as possible. This effort necessitates a 
self-critical evaluation of violent traits in the histories of 
the different religions, the elaboration of religion’s specific 
contributions to the future tasks of humankind and the need 
to work towards a consensus on basic ethical questions. 
Lastly, in the same context, all religions need to recognise 
that they have a great educational responsibility. They have 
opportunities to transform the ‘Golden Rule’ into daily 
practice. They can strengthen the moral identity of their 
adherents so that they develop respect for the dignity and 
integrity of their neighbours. In order to put an end to the 
spread of violence in societies, they have to plead for a politics 
that overcomes anomic situations and promotes justice.
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